

Chapter 6

The Recovery of Historical Memory Project of the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala: *Data Processing, Database Representation*

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Introduction

The REMHI (Recovery of Historical Memory) project in Guatemala originated at the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala (ODHAG), when the peace agreement negotiated by the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) approved the creation of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH). The mission of the CEH was to investigate crimes of the 36-year history of armed conflict.

The draft agreement allotted a working time of six months to one year for the CEH investigation. ODHAG was concerned about this limited amount of time for the CEH to operate. Familiar with the experience of El Salvador, ODHAG knew the difficulty of gathering evidence in such a limited time. They recognized the need for an in-depth investigation and preparation of a database that could be transferred to the CEH, and set up REMHI. The REMHI project was to provide a reconstruction of the country's history from the victims' perspective, not just supply a series of unprocessed lists and statistics to transfer to the CEH.

The concept of the task is what differentiates REMHI's work from other, similar organizations. REMHI's purpose was not to attempt to reveal or interpret the history, but to arrange and describe it through the voices of the very victims who, after all, had the best knowledge of the truth.

This project was conceived and initiated by Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera at the end of 1984 and was communicated to the rest of the bishops in the country with the intent that it would be adopted by the Episcopal Conference *in toto*. The Episcopal Conference of Guatemala decided that each bishop should individually choose whether to carry through the proposed work in his own diocese. Accordingly, work on the project started on April 1, 1995, as the coordinated effort of ten of the eleven dioceses in Guatemala.

REMHI's work is defined as "interdiocesan" because it was the result of the dioceses' coordination and it is precisely from their involvement, commitment and especially their "taking ownership" of the project, that the project developed and enhanced its activities.

The project was therefore conceived not only as a contribution to the peace process, but also as a factor in the reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric. This is why a fourth phase known as "the return" was added to the initial three phases of the project (preparation, collection of testimonies, and analysis).

This fourth phase is the principal contribution that the project can give to assist in the reconstruction of the Guatemalan social fabric, for it started its work by listening to the demands and proposals of the people interviewed. The return phase continues at the time of this writing (mid-1999).

Work Methodology


The Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala set up a work team whose function was to establish the necessary foundations to complete the proposed work.

This team — known as the Central Team — drafted an outline of the work methodology and completed the first project phase: preparation. The diocesan bishops designated trustworthy people to coordinate the work in their respective dioceses; they were the counterpart of the Central Team for work in the countryside.

Throughout the preparation phase, the Central Team outlined the work methodology. The diocesan coordinators, expanding the proposals presented by the Central Team completed these plans.

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The functional diagram of the project follows:



Sources of Information

Direct interviews are the basis of the information used by the REMHI project. In addition, data were obtained by analyzing the print media ("journalistic monitoring") from 1960 to 1996, case studies (civilian defense patrols, women, etc.), interviews with key informants (perpetrators and experts on related subjects), declassified information provided by the National Security Agency (NSA), and a series of studies known as monographs. The latter were documents covering investigations the leading actors of the internal armed conflict (the church, guerrillas, etc.).

To complete the interview information, the experts used monographs as a starting point, and used journalistic analyses to obtain information on context; informants filled in any gaps.

Databases in the REMHI Project

To systematize the information on which the project would rely, REMHI noted the need for three types of information:

- **Human Rights Violations** derived from the interviews.
- **Journalistic Monitoring** based on reviewing the major cases published in print media during 36 years of war. (The design of the journalistic monitoring database was simple, almost to the point of being a flat database.)
- **Information on Military Structures** that included names, posts and positions of members of the Guatemalan armed forces.

It was possible to create databases for the first two types. Due to lack of information, it was difficult to complete the data for military structures.

Due to the straightforward nature of the journalistic monitoring database and the impossibility of building Military Structures database these two subjects are not discussed any further in this document. In the balance of this paper, I discuss the Interview Database, my central theme.

Interview Database

One of the most important and difficult steps at the start of the project was defining what was expected of the information system, since the response to this question had implications that would influence the total development of the project.

The main definitional difficulty was articulating the project objective. According to the original conception of the project, we were to assemble a database with statistical and documentary aims, which could quickly transfer information to the CEH.

I explain the design of the database as having three principal phases, in chronological order:

1. Specification of the interview form
2. Creation of the database
3. Analysis of the first interviews

Specification of the Interview Form

Our greatest analysis and design problem was the creation of the interview form. The creation of the form was a four-month effort during which a series of proposed forms were presented to the project's General Coordinating Team that had final approval of the design of the forms.

It was this interaction that allowed the preparation of suitable forms for the case. Although the experience of the Truth Commission of El Salvador was useful, the Guatemalan reality is completely different because the mechanisms of terror were different. Guatemala has a different geography and 23 linguistic groups. Most importantly, those who conducted the interviews — *reconciliation facilitators* — had a different background from the interviewers on whom the El Salvador Truth Commission relied. The interviewers in El Salvador were foreign, salaried professionals who did not know the country and its history. In the REMHI project in Guatemala, on the other hand, interviewers were volunteers, indigenous peoples or residents of the area where they conducted the interviews. Also, most were religious with low levels of education and in many cases, spoke Spanish as their second language.

Implementation of the Interview Form

As the project evolved with respect to its original conception, we saw that the interviewers' role was much more than a simple interaction with the interviewee. They were individuals of the same region, volunteers whose roles transcended the initial interview. The organizers, whose training included a diversity of functions, besides interviews, were mostly drawn to the reconciliation ministry that had developed in some dioceses as a result of REMHI's return phase.

It was precisely these volunteers, with their deep personal commitment, who changed REMHI's vision, and it was because of them that the interview form changed drastically during its development. Initially it was a technical form, specific and limited. The early version of the form was confusing and impractical for many and instead of serving as a helpful tool to conduct interviews, it created additional problems in the interview process.

The main obstacle to implementing the interview form was that our culture does not have a written tradition. Rather, it is a narrative culture. This tradition limited the interviewer's ability to collect and transfer narrative information since the continuity of the story was lost in filling out a series of forms. Another obstacle — which now appears obvious — was that the interviewers would have to develop an initial coding system for the interview and that structure was reflected in the interview form. The coding system entailed specifying the code of the responsible force (perpetrator), the classification of the crime, and descriptive information about the actors as social groups for those who were victims (unions, NGOs, ethnic groups, etc). This had further negative implications that were discovered later. It proved impossible to assure that 700 team members working separately throughout the whole country would exercise uniform criteria and make similar decisions.

To correct these obstacles and other relatively minor obstacles such as the length of the form, the size of the paper, etc., we developed a less technical and more practical new set of forms. These forms helped guide the thread of the interview and allowed a more complete collection of information in a more orderly narrative manner. This important development was achieved through a continuing series of corrections that often seemed to be interminable.

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
In addition, we made a series of practical changes to improve the interview form. These included using larger letters and more readable fonts, providing ample writing spaces for organizers with little aptitude for writing, numbering the forms, identifying the different sections included in the form (deponent, victim, cover page, etc.) with different colors, etc. With prior authorization of the deponent, a tape recorder could be used to record the complete interview.

We also included specific spaces in the form to record information relating to coding. The purpose of this provision was to facilitate data processing.

The final version of the interview form is shown in Appendix 1.

Creating the Database

As already indicated, the starting point for the design of the database was the preparation of the interview forms. However, it was not until the time we designed the database that we considered issues relating to treatment of exact information on violations of human rights.



We recognized that the primary goal of the database was statistical documentation. To serve this goal, we attempted to classify the greatest possible amount of information: sociodemographic data, individual data, information relating to time and space, etc. The main challenge in this process was to break down the information to a level that would make possible the reconstruction of the facts.

Logical schema

Our concept of the appropriate information methodology was based on the following logical principles: There are three actors: one **victim**, one **perpetrator**, and one **deponent** (on whom we rely). These three people are related to each other by one act, the **violation**.

These *parts* (or *roles*) that individuals play cannot be fixed nor are they exclusive. The deponent can be the victim in another violation, or the victim or the perpetrator can be the same deponent, etc. Besides, the result of counting of these four units of information can be zero in the perpetrator's case, or multiple, since in a violent act there can be various victims, various perpetrators, different deponents or various abuses.

This large number of possible combinations was the main complication in the design. It led to a series of questions that were difficult to resolve. At first we required that the database tell us **who did what to whom**, and in addition, **who** reported this information. This requirement greatly complicated counting the actors, since the greater the breakdown we tried to achieve, the more complicated it was to maintain a structure (*links*) that would permit us to reconstruct the facts from the systematized information.

We confronted such dilemmas as how to create a database that in addition to showing the victims and cases would tell us exactly what the deponents reported. Thus, we tried to create a database that could relate what a certain deponent stated and who the deponent identified. In case another deponent mentioned another victim or other victims later, it was necessary to know the level of overlap that the interviews presented in order to affirm that deponent *x* mentioned victim *m* while deponent *z* mentioned victim *m*, and also deponent *n*.

At the level of database design this situation could have been easily resolved. However, such a solution would have complicated inputting the information to a database and in the long run

would have been impractical. In view of this situation, we settled on only maintaining the link by case. Hence, we would know who were the perpetrators, the victims and the deponents.

As a result of this reasoning, the structure represented above has the case at its center. This is the linking mechanism for the three actors (victim, perpetrator, and deponent) to achieve the goal of indicating who did what to whom, and furthermore who told us. From this point we can choose the most convenient unit of analysis, which could be the interview, victim, violation, victim per violation, etc. The important thing was that the database should not limit this choice so that we could make a final decision later, since we were not set on any of the three choices from the start.

Data structure

For the definition of a fact, we considered that a fact could contain different violations, each one with its own respective data (date, place, responsible force, etc.) that bear a close relation such as causality, context, etc. This definition, similar to what Patrick Ball defines as *context*, is what permits us to differentiate a series of violations committed together against one or various victims from another series of violations committed independently one by one. It is what permits us to maintain the relation in a disappearance-torture-murder *modus operandi* and differentiate an act of torture and murder performed on one victim but carried out in a different context.

Below is a schematic representation of the data structure. We explain it, working from left to right:

Interview Number	Collective Case Number	Fact Number	Violation Number	Order
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- The *Interview Number* is the unique identifier of the case.
- The *Collective Case Number* is information compiled where there was a group of victims in which some people suffered certain violations different from the rest of the group. Our need for this became apparent when the first tests were made with the database. The most common case was that in which a group of people were detained, subsequently tortured and the women sexually abused, and some people did not survive the torture and died. In this case, three numbers of different patterns were specified: one for the victims that were disappeared and tortured; one for the victims that were disappeared, tortured and sexually abused; and another for victims who were disappeared, tortured and who died (extrajudicial execution). However, in order to maintain the unit in these cases and subsequently regroup them, a number was assigned to the common, collective case for these three patterns.
- The *Fact Number* is information that permits us to group those violations that bear a direct relationship, such as torture and extrajudicial execution, which occur in succession. These violations were counted with one common fact number so they could be linked.
- The *Violation Number* is a foreign key that directs us to a table of violations in which pertinent data, such as the date, place, type, etc., are specified.
- The *Order* indicates the sequence of cases since there could be more than one violation in the pattern. Thus, if a person was detained and tortured, the detention would have Order number 1 and torture, Order number 2.

A proposed alternative to this division would have been to create a disappearance/torture pattern for all of the victims, and add sexual abuse or death as a second and third pattern. It is important to note that this structure of collective patterns can become confusing since a detached look at it reveals an artificial division of a concrete case that should be kept as a single unit.

- The utility of the interview number was that it retained the relation of the database information with the written documents.

For performance considerations, other data were added, for example, the type of violation. Although this variable appears in the table of violations, this field allowed us to make general calculations without needing to relate it to the rest of the tables in the database.

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It is important to know how relations were handled in the database:

- The deponents were related by their interview numbers. Since a number of deponents could have spoken about the same case, the interview number would tell us the indirect relation.
- The victims were related by the fact numbers. Note that we assume that the victim suffered all of the violations shared by the same pattern number.
- The individual perpetrators were related by way of the violation number, since they are different from the victims in that one cannot assume that the perpetrator participated in all the specific violations of the pattern.

The treatment of massacres

Most of these inconveniences were resolved, but there was one issue we discovered in the form preparation that could not be resolved until the creation of the database. This issue related to the treatment of the massacres: How were we to handle the massacres? The answer to this question depends on the answer to a larger question: How do we define a "massacre"? To define a criterion by which to label a case as a massacre is more complicated than it appears to be at first sight. It could be according to the number of victims, the number of violations, the brutality with which the acts were committed, etc. Finally, as we often did for other decisions, we opted for an unconventional, but functional definition. We defined *massacre* as that confusing act (from the deponent's/victim's point of view) whose final objective was **communal** destruction.

This involved considerations of intention, outcome, etc. Clearly, no one criterion exists to label or not label an act as a massacre; it was a **policy** that permitted analysts of the interviews to have a parameter of evaluation that was sufficiently broad and yet as precise in measure as possible.

We designed the interview database to meet these criteria and followed them closely in the majority of design decisions that we made.

For practical effects and with the intent of facilitating database input, cases that concerned one victim were differentiated from those that concerned more than one victim. Thus, it was at the interface level of the database and the forms that the differentiation between *individual cases* and *collective cases* took place. The flow charts for the three cases -- individual violations, collective violations and massacres -- are shown in Appendixes 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

It was anticipated that for massacres we would have to use a slightly different structure, since the count for actors and cases was highly variable. We realized that the compiled information would be complex, confusing and above all, incomplete. For that reason, our first database design did not consider the systematization of information relating to the massacres. We decided to wait on the first interviews to make the necessary decisions with real cases and detailed information.

However, massacres were coded simply as massacres, and did not use the detailed codes of kinds of violations. The omission of the detailed violation types from the massacre coding -- a representational error -- created an accidental bias. Many people in massacres were raped, tortured, and disappeared, but they were not coded as having suffered these violations -- they were coded only as having suffered "massacre." The other violations were not coded. (Victims of "massacre" were treated in the analysis as having been killed but not counted as having been raped or another other violation) As a result, after the non-massacre and massacre data were mixed together, the statistics reported for all violations (except death) actually meant 'violations excluding massacres' because if those violations did happen in the context of a massacre, they were not recorded in the database. But this was not how the statistics were interpreted.

A higher proportion of massacres were committed by some perpetrators than by others, and this proportional difference among perpetrators was greater for massacres than for some other violations. The representation error biased the proportion of responsibility attributed to some perpetrators relative to other perpetrators for some non-death types of violations. Perpetrators who committed more massacres were artificially counted as having committed proportionally slightly fewer non-fatal violations.

Data Processing

With the final design of the interview forms and the first database design completed, we started our work on the processing of data. This function was supposed to last approximately three months. It depended on a work team of five to eight people whose task was to input the data from the interviews.

Coding

For this work, two major tasks were identified, *coding* and *data-input*. Coding was the task of assigning codes to diverse classifications on which we relied, such as the place of the events, sectoral classifications, responsible forces, etc. Data-input was the task of transcribing the forms on paper to the database system.

Due to (1) the nature of coding, the mechanism designed for data entry, (2) the short period of time needed for the team to accomplish the work, (3) the status of computer technology at the time (the beginning of 1995), and (4) the systems analyst's experience, it was urgent to start the work as soon as possible. We decided that inputting the information to the database would be done with a text-based interface and that subsequently we would create a system using a graphic user interface for data query.

The Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala at the time relied on a Novell Netware 3.1 Network Operating System with an Ethernet protocol using star topology installations. A small computing center was established with four workstations with a topological bus for cost reasons. To avoid overloading traffic on the network, an additional network card was installed in the server exclusively for the computing center. The database was developed on FoxPro 2.6 for DOS, the same as the journalistic database.

Analysis of the First Interviews

With the start of information compilation, the first interviews from in the countryside came in. They were the input to the first tests and evaluations of the designed system. The objective of these tests was to determine the efficacy of both the manual and the automatic procedures designed for the information system.

In addition, we had a series of detailed situations about which we had not had sufficient information to make decisions in the design phase. We hoped to get information from the incoming interviews that would give us more hard facts to work with. For example, the treatment of massacres was among the main problems. Prior to receipt of interviews from the field, information on what was expected was often incomplete and sometimes confusing.

Although some case information was specific enough, most interviews gave inexact references that complicated quantifying the violations in a massacre ("They separated the women and raped the youngest ones"). For this reason we opted to quantify the number of dead and disappeared victims within a list of victims that did not specify if the victims listed were dead or disappeared ("We never heard of them again"). Since this decision left out cases of torture, rape, threats, attempts, etc., we covered this gap with qualitative explanations, such as the *modus operandi* of the massacres. (In the end it turned out to be more valuable to indicate that in most massacres women were raped, rather than indicate the number of rape victims which would in any case be an approximate figure.)

Thus, at the level of database structure, the massacre became a new type of violation with a violation number and its own pattern number that would make use of the existing data structure.

Working with the massacre interviews was more complicated than working with the individual and collective violations because the data came from a much larger number of interviews, which created conflicting versions. There were similar names, and we did not know if these represented the same people (e.g., José Antonio Velázquez versus José Velasco), contradictory data (especially the date), and above all, differing versions because of each deponent's statement as to what he or she could observe.

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To have a level of specialization that would allow us to determine whether an interview was related to what was mentioned in another interview, we had the analysts distribute the work by geographical areas. This helped to determine the exact date of a massacre, for example.

Consequently, the list of victims was maintained separately from the main list, but kept exactly the same structure. However, from the information on which we could draw we managed to obtain the name, sex, age, and at times, the ethnic group identification of the victim.

Among the new scenarios encountered upon receiving the interviews and entering them into the database, we noticed that when there was more than one deponent for the same case, we would come across data that could be either complementary or contradictory. For example, one deponent might report a number of victims and another deponent gave us a different number. Even worse were cases where one deponent informed us of a disappeared victim and another deponent mentioned the death of the same victim.

Since the project did not investigate or dig deeper into the interviews we received, in many instances we lacked sufficient resources to disqualify an interview. The answer to this dilemma was that we would have to adapt the database so it was able to store different versions of the same case.

This decision implied a potential artificial inflation of the statistics. Therefore, at the time of calculating the statistics we had to make decisions to resolve this problem to avoid biasing the results. At the level of the database structure we resolved this problem in the following manner:

1. The information was complementary. For example, one deponent is specific about the date of the violation, but the other deponent is not. We would then modify the violation previously stored in the database, use the same pattern number, violation number, collective number and order number, but specify a different interview number.
2. The information was contradictory. We recorded everything anew as if it were its own case so that in the end, we could group the patterns by victim and decide which of the different versions we would use in the final analysis.
3. The information was neither complementary nor contradictory. Duplication was taken into account in the creation of statistics and final lists with the aim of not artificially inflating the statistics.


It was during the analysis of the first interviews that the analysts and investigators discovered the great potential of interviews as investigative material. However, until that time we had not taken measures at the level of the database so that we could recover this information.

The Thesaurus

Since this material was mainly qualitative information, the cost of incorporating it in the database made it an almost impossible task. We therefore created the *Thesaurus*, which was a list of keywords identified by project investigators. The words dealt with subjects such as the *modus operandi*, effects on victims and their families and communities, demands, proposals, cultural questions, ethnic issues, etc.

The Thesaurus was initially proposed by investigators according to subject —religion, perpetrators, effects, demands, etc. — and throughout its use was enhanced by the information processing team. The Thesaurus is summarized in Appendix 5.

The Thesaurus-based system was the tool on which investigators depended when maximizing the narrative capacity of those interviewed. In this way we hoped to conduct a detailed investigation (the individual effects on women in a certain region in the western part of the country, for example) that would cross the base information regarding violations with Thesaurus keys to obtain a list of interviews mentioning the subject. Thus, our conceptualization of information would remain as is specified in the following figure:



This new complexity and revised use of the database created the need for an interface for the database that should be easy to use. The new interface would allow investigators to perform reference and cross checks in the database. We developed this new interface with FoxPro 2.6, in a Windows 3.11 graphic environment.

Data Input

The data processing team (*coders*) had to carry out tasks and develop methods that had not at first been contemplated. Among the most important were transcribing the interviews, in some cases, six hours in length. This called for analyzing the Thesaurus, interacting with analysts, and discussing the parameters and policies that guided how decisions were made (such as the case of the difference between a disappearance and a forced disappearance). Inputting information to the database was a process that ultimately involved 18 people and took 20 months.

Once information input to the database was complete, we created cleaning processes to reduce duplications in the database. We did this even though from the beginning, the computerized system indicated the actors whose first name and surname coincided with data that was specified at the time the information was inputted.

To calculate descriptive statistics, we exported the database to Excel and through pivot tables (dynamic crosstabulations) we were able to perform most calculations and create desired charts.

Lessons Learned

Problem	Solution	Issues
Lack of uniformity. Everyone did not always understand the policies and take similar actions in similar situations.	The decisions were made by the coding team, which took into consideration the opinions of all project personnel. Important decisions concerned the violation type, use of thesaurus, classifications. Internal workshops to structure the discussion, training in different aspects (gender, ethnic affairs, etc.) and sharing of experiences.	Sometimes, the discussions seemed annoying and tedious, but in the end were perceived as helpful. The quality and profile of the coding team is an important factor in success of the discussions. The coding team was the key source for every detail.

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Finding qualitative information. It was hard to find qualitative information integrated into 6,000 interviews.	Set up and used keywords (Thesaurus).	The elaboration of the thesaurus is sensitive work; anything not specified in it will be untraceable.
Mixed violations.	Don't do it again! Treat massacres just like all other violations.	
Lack of Graphics.	Next time, include more graphs	
Horror of codifying.	Any code used in the database should have a zero value option.	
Control of existing work.	Even though the input of a whole interview can take a long time, the input of general information about the interview itself is a task that consumes little time. Thus, every time interviews were received, the coding team inputted into the database the id # of the interview, and some general information (date, place of interview, and so forth)	This practice proved to be helpful for other purposes such as control of flow, distribution of work, interviews tracking, etc. When controlling the development of the activities of the coding team, it's easy to know how much has the team done, but hard to know how much is left. All you can do is to make an estimate.
Fatigue, emotional issues.	Workshops to discuss these issues. Be creative. Don't ignore this issue!	Working in data entry in a database that deals with human rights violations means more than keypunching. The "key-punchers" are people who must deal with atrocities and horrors, the pain of others, etc.
Where to start in database design.	Read Ball, <i>Who did What to Whom</i> , Washington: AAAS (1996).	Don't try to re-invent the wheel, find out what has already been done.
Incomplete information.	Build a system capable of managing incomplete data. We made printed forms for the victims of massacre. Since the original forms used one sheet per victim and most of the data was missing, we made a special form for listing the victims, their names, gender, date of birth and ethnic group.	Try always for the highest level of completeness of data. However, when working with this type of information (from a period of 5-35 years), it is certain that much of the data will be incomplete and imprecise, especially dates.
Dispersion of decision-making.	Log decisions, so you can gather all the decisions in the data analysis phase.	It is impractical and not advisable to centralize the decision-making process in one person. The process of decision-making, is carried on throughout the course of the project and is distributed in space, time and throughout the organization. An inevitable risk that must be dealt with.
Lack of ready access to, or availability of information.	Easy-to-use interfaces so anyone can sit at a computer and search information.	
Success of the project	Those individuals who worked in more operational tasks (interviewers, encoders, etc.) are the best source of evaluations, ideas and understanding of how to make the project a success.	Facing the fact that preparation, capacity and experience of the people who design, structure and direct the project is necessary, but not sufficient.

Appendix 1

Interview forms

Cover page

Interview number	five digits
Date of interview	dd/mm/yy
Location of interview	
Type of violation (mark those that pertain)	Killing (extrajudicial execution Massacre (more than five dead) Assault Detention (forcible disappearance) Torture Threat Other
Property Loss	Yes, no.
Location of violations	
Date of violations	dd/mm/yy
Was the interview recorded?	Yes, no
How many cassettes were used?	
Additional pages	Victim Summary Perpetrator Deponent Other documents

Victim

Interview number	five digits
Victim number	eight digits
Surname(s)	
Given name(s)	
Other names used	
Name not known	
Gender	Male, Female
Pregnant?	Yes, No

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Documentation	Official identification papers Birth certificate Baptismal certificate Refugee or displaced person document Passport Other
Document number	
Expires in	
Birth date	dd/mm/yy
Age	count
(Year)	
Place of birth	Canton Village <i>Caserio</i> ¹ Plot <i>Finca</i>
Place name	
Place identification	eight digit code
Municipality	
Department	
Country	
Mother tongue	plus two digit code
Profession or office	plus two digit code
Where were you living when the act occurred?	
Father's given name	
Mother's given name	
Marital status	Single Married (living together) Widow (er) Divorced or separated
Given name of spouse	
Total number of children that you have (live and dead)	Given name, status
Of which groups a member? (Political, military, social, community, trade union, refugee, displaced person, etc.)	Category of group, name of group, dates, duties
Comments	

¹ *Caserio* is a smaller division than a village. Several *Caserios* comprise a village.

Summary

In narrative form, answers to the following questions:

1. Who was the victim?
2. What followed, where and when?
3. Who were the perpetrators of what followed?
4. Why did the acts follow?
5. What motives provoked the acts?
6. What was done to confront the situation?
7. What must be done to avoid a repetition of these acts of violence?

Perpetrator

Interview number	five digits
Perpetrator number	eight digits
Surname(s)	
Given name(s)	
Other names used	
Gender	Male, female
Documentation	Official identification papers Birth certificate Baptismal certificate Refugee or displaced person document Passport Other
Document number	
Expires in	
Birth date	dd/mm/yy
Age	count
(Year)	
Place of birth	Canton (district) Village <i>Caserio</i> Plot House
Place name	

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Place identification	eight digit code
Municipality	
Department	
Country	
Mother tongue	plus two digit code
To what force(s) did the perpetrator belong when the acts were committed?	Name of the force Duties plus five digit code
Who was responsible for these violations?	plus two digit code plus one digit code
How is it known that this person was responsible	
Is it known if this person participated in violations in other, different cases?	
Is it known where this person is now?	
Comments	

Deponent


Interview number	five digits
Deponent number	eight digits
Are you the victim?	Yes, No
Were you present during the acts?	Yes, No
Surname(s)	
Given name(s)	
Gender	Male, Female
Birth date	dd/mm/yy
Documentation	Official identification papers Birth certificate Baptismal certificate Refugee or displaced person document Passport Other
Document number	
Expires in	
Mother tongue	two digit code
Age	count
What is the relation between you and the victim?	
Do you know how to read and write?	Canton (district) Village <i>Caserio</i> Plot House
Are there other persons who know something about the acts?	Yes, No
If it were necessary, can we meet with you another time?	Yes, No how?
Do you give your permission to present your testimony to the Truth Commission, including your identity?	Yes, No
Do you give your permission to present your testimony to the Truth Commission, without your identity?	Yes, No
Signature (mark) of the deponent.	
Date	dd/mm/yy

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Language in which the interview was conducted.	
Comments	


Appendix 2

Flow chart for individual violations




Appendix 3

Flow chart for collective violations



Appendix 4

Flow chart for massacres



Appendix 5

Thesaurus

Types of Violations

1. Death caused by:
 - 1.1 Extrajudicial execution
 - 1.2 Indiscriminate attack
 - 1.3 Bomb
 - 1.4 Artillery
 - 1.5 Explosives
 - 1.6 Mines
 - 1.7 Crossfire
 - 1.8 Other
2. Death resulting from Persecution:
 - 2.1 Suicide
 - 2.2 Hunger
 - 2.3 Illness
 - 2.4 Accident
 - 2.5 Other
3. Forced Disappearance:
 - 3.1 No Reappearance
 - 3.2 Reappeared Alive
 - 3.3 Reappeared Dead Date of Reappearance: ___/___/___
 - 3.4 Unknown
4. Disappearance:
 - 4.1 No Reappearance
 - 4.2 Reappeared Alive
 - 4.3 Reappeared Dead Date of Reappearance: ___/___/___
 - 4.4 Unknown
5. Forced Detention
6. Torture:
 - 6.1 Cruel and inhumane treatment
 - 6.2 Torture
7. Sexual Violation
8. Attack against personal integrity with injury:
 - 8.1 Knives, etc.
 - 8.2 Firearm
 - 8.3 Bomb
 - 8.4 Artillery
 - 8.5 Explosives/Mines
 - 8.6 Other
9. Attack against an institution or group with damage:
 - 9.1 Firearms
 - 9.2 Bomb
 - 9.3 Artillery
 - 9.4 Explosives/Mines
 - 9.5 Other
10. Threats against people:
 - 10.1 Bomb Alarm
 - 10.2 Death Threat
 - 10.3 Intimidation
 - 10.4 Other
11. Threats against an institution or group:
 - 11.1 Bomb Alarm

- 11.2 Death Threat
- 11.3 Intimidation
- 11.4 Other
- 12. Irregular Detention
- 13. Other Violations

Responsible Forces

- 1. Army
 - 1.1 EMP: General Presidential Staff (or Estado Mayor Presidencial)
 - 1.2 DSP: Office of Presidential Security (or Dirección de Seguridad Presidencial) (Archive)
 - 1.3 Presidential Guard
 - 1.4 G-2 Place
 - 1.5 S-5 Place
 - 1.6 *Kaibiles*² Place
 - 1.7 Traveling Military Police
 - 1.8 Specialists Place
 - 1.9 Ministry of Defense
 - 1.10 General Defense Staff
 - 1.11 Air Force
 - 1.12 Brigade
 - 1.13 Military Zone
 - 1.14 Military Base
 - 1.15 Special Command
 - 1.16 Outpost
 - 1.17 Other
- 2. Police
 - 2.1 National Police
 - Section
 - Station
 - Substation
 - 2.2 Special Command
 - 2.3 National Guard
 - 2.4 Municipal Police Place
 - 2.5 Judicial Police Place
 - 2.6 Other
- 3. Combined Forces
- 4. Irregular Forces
 - 4.1 Commissioned Soldiers Place
 - 4.2 PAC: Civilian Self-Defense Patrols Place
- 5. Death Squads
 - 5.1 Mano Blanco
 - 5.2 ESA: Secret Anticommunist Army (Ejército Secreto Anticomunista)
 - 5.3 NOA: New Anticommunist Organization (Nueva Organización Anticomunista)
 - 5.4 JJ: Avenging Jaguar (Jaguar Justiciero)
 - 5.5 Other
- 6. Insurgent Forces
 - 6.1 EGP: Guerrilla Army of the Poor
 - 6.2 ORPA: Organization of the People in Arms
 - 6.3 FAR: Armed Rebel Forces
 - 6.4 PGT: Guatemalan Workers' Party
 - 6.5 Unitary Front
 - 6.6 URNG
 - 6.7 Other

² Special Task Force

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7. Unidentified
 - 7.1 Civilian clothed
 - 7.2 Uniformed
 - 7.3 Unknown
8. Mayors, Farmers, Private security forces, etc.
9. Others

Types of Responsibility

1. Lone vigil (patrolling or similar)
2. Participation in violation of Physical Integrity (executing, torturing, etc.)
3. Participation in violation against Property (burning houses, destroying crops, etc.)
4. Intellectual Responsibility (commanding)
5. Collaborator

